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To Chris and Jane
If industry and labor are left to take their own course, they will generally be directed to those objects which are the most productive, and this in a more certain and direct manner than the wisdom of the most enlightened Legislature could point out. James Madison
ABSTRACT
About 93.4 percent, approximately 25 million acres, of 
the land area of the four counties comprising southern Nevada 
is controlled by some government agency. The control of such 
a great amount of land may represent an impediment to the 
action of a free market in southern Nevada.
The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) is the largest of 
several government land managers, with three-fourths of the 
acreage described above in its domain, and for that reason 
this paper concentrates on BLM regulations and practices.
The BLM was created in 1946 with the merger of the Grazing 
Service and the General Land Office. The land it controlled 
had not been claimed under previous efforts to put it in pri­
vate hands and was called "the land nobody wanted." Under 
BLM stewardship this land became a vast "commons," over- 
grazed and consequently turned into a dustbowl. The BLM had 
little power until the passage of the Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act (FLPMA) of 1976.
In addition to the FLPMA, four other laws have particu­
lar significance to BLM land management actions in southern 
Nevada: the Mining Law of 1872; the Wilderness Act of 1964; 
the Endangered Species Act of 1973; and the Wild Horse and 
Burro Act of 1971. These laws and BLM actions resultant
iii
are examined in some detail with examples of how their 
implementation impedes the free market. The ability of 
special interest groups to influence BLM decisions and 
provide themselves a public good through the use of the 
government, at taxpayers expense, is examined in several of 
the examples.
The solution is privatization of the BLM controlled land 
and abolition of the BLM. This will not necessarily defeat 
the motives of the special interest groups and will espe­




AUM Animal Unit Months
BLM Bureau of Land Management
DOI Department of the Interior
EA Environmental Assessment
EIS Environmental Impact Statement
FLPMA Federal Land Policy and Management Act
NEPA National Environmental Policy Act
RMP-EIS Resource Management Plan - Environmental Impact
Statement
U.S.C.A. United States Code Annotated
WSA's Wilderness Study Areas
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About 93.4 percent of the land area of southern 
Nevada (Clark, Lincoln, Nye, and Esmeralda counties) is 
controlled by government: city; county; state; or federal 
(Nevada, Governor's Office of Community Services 1986,
399). Because a system of property rights must exist 
before an economic system can develop markets, the public 
ownership of so much of the land would suggest that govern­
ment land management presents an impediment to the action 
of a free market in southern Nevada (Carroll 1983, 304). 
Government tries to keep the land from being a commons, the 
opposite of a system of private property, by assigning 
quasi-rights through allotments, allocations, rule-makings, 
and regulations. This paper will examine the assignment 
process, comment on its success, and offer suggestions for 
improvement.
Although the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service; the 
National Park Service; the Department of Energy; the U.S. 
Air Force; and state, county, and city governments collect­
ively control over 6 million acres in southern Nevada, they 
are fragmented and insignificant compared with the Bureau 
of Land Management (BLM) which directly administers over
2
18 million acres. The BLM also has surface management 
responsibility for the Nellis Air Force Base Range, an 
additional 2.2 million acres (U.S. Department of the Inte­
rior, Bureau of Land Management 1989a, 1-1). Because the 
other federal agencies have similar rules and because the 
BLM controls so much land, this paper will focus on a 
selected set of public laws that form the legal basis for 
BLM land management. The parent organization of the BLM is 
the Department of the Interior (DOI).
Created in 1849, the Department of the Interior - America's Department of Natural Resources - is concerned with the management, conservation, and development of the Nation's water, wildlife, mineral, forest, and park and recreation resources (U.S. Depart­ment of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management 1977, 
2).
The primary uses of BLM land in southern Nevada are 
recreation, mining, and grazing.
Recreation encompasses such activities as hunting, 
fishing, rockhounding, off-road vehicle operation and rac­
ing, hiking, and camping. Over 194,000 hunting and fishing 
licenses were issued by Nevada in 1987. The big game 
animal which produced the greatest harvest was the deer, 
with almost 22,000 taken. The total take of waterfowl was 
75,050 and the dove represented the greatest harvest of 
upland game with 115,866 taken, followed closely by quail, 
rabbit, and Chukar partridge (Nevada, Governor's Office of 
Community Services 1988, 329-33). Off road vehicle races, 
sponsored by groups like the High Desert Racing Association
3
and the Southern Nevada Off Road Enthusiasts, are held 
regularly. Additionally, three public camp grounds are 
operated in southern Nevada by the BLM (Ibid., 313-14).
Fifty-five companies, with employment in 1987 of 1857 
people, conduct mining operations in southern Nevada.
About 400,000 ounces of gold and 3,000,000 ounces of silver 
were reported produced in the same year. Other important 
minerals produced were borates, cement, clay, diatomite, 
gypsum, lime, lithium carbonate, and sand and gravel 
(Nevada Bureau of Mines and Geology 1988, 23, 25-8, 41-52).
The magnitude of grazing is shown by the 1987 inven­
tory of 89,000 cattle and calves and 2,000 sheep and lambs 
in the four-county southern Nevada area. Cash receipts 
from livestock were $26,555,000 in the area in 1986 
(Nevada, Governor's Office of Community Services 1988, 340, 
342, 363).
Large areas of land are closed to public use of any 
kind, for example, withdrawn land, like the Nellis Air 
Force Base Range. Some acreage, such as Wilderness Study 
Areas, are limited to specified recreational uses. Other 
constraints to use, such as wetlands protection and flood- 
plain assessments, implemented by Executive Order in 
furtherance of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 




Prior to the late 19th century, government land man­
agement policy encouraged development of the west. The 
Homestead Act and the Railroad Act of 1862 literally gave 
away millions of acres to settlers and the railroad indus­
try (Nash and others 1986a, 453, 527).
The Mining Law of 1872, primarily authored by Senator 
Stewart of Nevada, furthered development, stating that
11. . . all valuable mineral deposits in lands belonging to 
the United States, both surveyed and unsurveyed, are hereby 
declared to be free and open to exploration and purchase 
. . . (Mining Law of 1872, 30 U.S.C.A, Sec. 22)."
Political philosophy began to change to conservation 
in the late 19th century. Prior to the turn of the cen­
tury, "Much of the forested lands in the East and Midwest, 
especially land that had been acquired cheaply or that was 
still under public ownership, had been stripped of its 
timber by private exploiters and left to erode and wash 
away into the nearest river (Kremp 1981, 126)." Teddy 
Roosevelt, with the urging of Gifford Pinchot, a European 
trained forest management specialist, and John Muir, an 
organizer of the Sierra Club, caused the set-aside of 150 
million acres of public land during his administration.
This began with the creation of the Yellowstone National 
Park in 1872 (Nash and others 1986b, 713-14). "Shortly 
thereafter, in 1891, Congress passed the Forest Reserve
5
Act, authorizing the president to withdraw public land for 
the protection of trees. . . .  In 1905, the Forest Service 
was established to administer the land (Kremp 1981, 126)." 
There was an obvious perception of market failure; the 
belief that free markets did not foster the advancement of 
society as a whole by allocating resources to their most 
productive uses. To overcome this perception, government 
stepped to the fore to direct allocation.
The zeal which caused these initial set-asides con­
tinued throughout the first part of the 20th century; so 
much so, that most of the western half of the country has 
never been relinquished by the federal government.
Although the initial conservation push was directed 
at forested land, even if it was marginal, there was a 
great reluctance on the part of the government to privatize 
any land.
When homesteading was possible, a large portion of 
"desert" land was ignored by settlers because its produc­
tivity was low. It was called "the land nobody wanted." It 
did have value as marginal grazing land and became a free, 
common pasture for cattle and sheep grazing. It developed 
into the classic "tragedy of the commons" and was soon 
overgrazed. Rather than selling the land to the ranchers 
that were using it, the government responded with the 
Taylor Grazing Act in June 1934, which created the Grazing 
Service. The Grazing Service was merged with the General
6
Land Office in 1946 and the resulting organization was 
called the BLM (Ibid., 126-8).
During the Johnson and Nixon administrations, there 
was an "explosion" of regulatory laws (Higgs 1989, 246). 
Four of these have particular significance to federal land 
management actions in southern Nevada: the Federal Land 
Policy and Management Act of 1976; the Wilderness Act of 
1964; the Endangered Species Act of 1973; and the Wild 
Horse and Burro Act of 1971.
7
CHAPTER 2 
LAWS, DISCUSSION, AND EXAMPLES
Federal Land Policy and Management. Act 
The Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) of 
1976 is the organic act of the BLM. It codified and per­
petuated the functions that the BLM had acquired since 
1946. In section 102 of the FLPMA, Congress declares that 
it is a policy of the United States that: (a) public lands 
are to be retained in Federal ownership; (b) public lands 
are periodically and systematically inventoried and subject 
to a coordinated land use planning process; (c) classifi­
cations of public lands completed prior to the passage of 
this act be reviewed; (d) Congress can execute its Consti­
tutional authority to withdraw public lands; (e) the 
Secretary of the Interior must establish rules and regu­
lations implementing this act with consideration of the 
general public; (f) judicial review of public land adju­
dication decisions is authorized; (g) management of the 
public lands be on the basis of multiple use and sustained 
yield; (h) public lands be managed in a manner that will 
protect the quality of scientific, scenic, historical, 
ecological, environmental, air and atmospheric, water 
resource, and archaeological values; preserve and protect 
some lands in natural condition; provide food and habitat
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for fish, wildlife, and domestic animals; and provide 
outdoor recreation and human occupancy and use; (i) the 
government receive fair market value for the use of public 
lands and resources; (j) uniform procedures be developed 
for disposal, acquisition, or exchange of public lands;
(k) rules and regulations be developed for protection of 
areas of critical environmental concern; (1) public lands 
be managed such that the nation's need for minerals, food, 
timber, and fiber is recognized; and (m) payment in lieu of 
taxes is made to states because of the immunity of public 
lands to taxation (FLPMA, 43 U.S.C.A., Sec. 1701).
As Hazlitt points out, "The art of economics consists 
in looking not merely at the immediate but at the longer 
effects of any act or policy; it consists in tracing the 
consequences of that policy not merely for one group but 
for all groups (Hazlitt 1979, 17).” An examination of some 
of these policy statements, with examples of their imple­
mentation, follows.
Federal Ownership
The FLPMA, in section 203, makes it difficult for the 
BLM to sell government land. Three criteria apply: (a) the 
tract of land must be difficult or uneconomic to manage 
because of its location or other characteristics; or 
(b) the tract was acquired for a specific purpose which is 
no longer valid; or (c) sale of a tract serves important 
public objectives, such as community growth, which outweigh
9
all other public objectives. Further, the sale of any 
tract over 2,500 acres must be submitted to Congress for 
rejection. Only if Congress fails to act within 90 days 
can the sale take place (FLPMA, 43 U.S.C.A., Sec. 1713). 
Even with these impediments, sales do take place. Most of 
the growth in the northwest part of the Las Vegas valley is 
on land previously owned by the government. A competitive 
bid process is used, but the land must not be sold at less 
than a fair market value as determined by the Secretary of 
the Interior (Ibid.). Since this land has always been in 
the public sector, determination of the fair market value 
is difficult, but is done by land appraisers using compa­
rable recent sales of the same type of land.
The Secretary of the Interior may also modify the 
bidding process or eliminate it completely "(1) to assure 
equitable distribution among purchasers of lands, or (2) to 
recognize equitable considerations or public policies, 
including but not limited to, a preference to users 
(Ibid.)." In recognizing a preference to users, individ­
uals with no connections rank fourth on the preference 
list, after state and local governments and adjoining 
landowners. This policy can stifle the free market by 
bureaucratically assigning rights to potential buyers 
rather than letting the price mechanism of a free market 
work. It could encourage collusion and cronyism among 
bureaucrats and their wards.
In a free market, both parties to an exchange believe 
that they have benefitted. The government, on the one 
hand, is not benefiting, because of its policy to retain 
this land in federal ownership. On the other hand, land 
sales do generate some revenue for the government. What 
explains this apparent dichotomy? One explanation is 
advanced by Fort and Baden. "More support for a bureau­
cratic agency can be generated by increasing benefits 
selectively than by reducing costs generally. It is 
bureaucratically profitable to cultivate a concentrated 
group of beneficiaries (Fort and Baden 1981, 12)." In 
short, selling land under favorable circumstances to a 
connected individual or group that will or has supported 
extension or maintenance of BLM actions is politically 
profitable.
Even though some of these practices may be onerous, 
the land disposed of in this manner eventually finds its 
way into the private sector, where secondary sales are more 
likely to be free market oriented.
No discussion is advanced in the FLPMA about why 
these lands are to be retained in federal control as the 
policy statement says. Historically, as previously noted, 
this was land that nobody wanted, most likely because there 
was insufficient population and a lower level of technology 
available for development of the land. This led to its 
becoming a commons. As Bish notes:
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The usual suggestions for resolving the 'commons prob­lem' are either assigning complete property rights or introducing a monopoly regulatory agency with the coer­cive power to limit access. . . . This problem isclearly one that can emerge from competition among politicians and bureaucrats to satisfy citizen pref­erences in a federal system (Bish 1987, 391).
Obviously, a monopoly regulatory agency was established.
But technology has advanced and the population has grown; 
why is it still necessary to have federal control? The BLM 
created a system of pseudo-property rights for the land 
under it's control by the use of rules promulgated after 
public review and comment. The segment of the population 
that extensively uses public land has a vested interest in 
this review and comment process. Higgs advances the idea 
of the mixed economy, part market and part government reg­
ulated:
The most important legacy of the New Deal . . .  is a certain system of belief, the now-dominant ideology of 
the mixed economy, which holds that the government is an immensely useful means for achieving one's private 
aspirations and that one's resort to this reservoir ofpotentially appropriable benefits is perfectly legiti­mate (Higgs 1989, 195).
This means that it is in the interest of those individuals
and groups that use the land to perpetuate the regulatory
agency, jockeying for relative advantage with other users 
by proposing legislation or regulations favorable to their 
cause and closely monitoring the public review and comment 
process. "The common observation that special interests 
have inordinate influence upon a democratic State is with­
out doubt empirically well founded. . . . unorganized
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groups have some influence upon the policies of a demo­
cratic State. But other things being equal, groups which 
organize and campaign for policies have a significant 
advantage (Hummel 1990, 101)."
The majority of the public is apathetic to these spe­
cial interests; the majority does not perceive that it is 
being used, although that is clearly the case. "A bureau 
and its relatively few but passionately interested clients 
. . . extract substantial benefits for themselves, imposing
the costs thinly over a much larger group of taxpayers or 
persons who bear costs indirectly. . . (Higgs 1989, 68)."
An example of that public apathy is demonstrated by partic­
ipation in the scoping process for the forthcoming Tonopah 
Resource Management Plan -Environmental Impact Statement.
"A Bureau of Land Management plan to decide future uses for 
6.1 million acres of south central Nevada has generated 
little interest although it involves one-eighth of the 
property the BLM controls in Nevada . . . (Myers 1990,
A5).11 This land area comprises all of Esmeralda and the 
northern one-third of Nye counties. Public meetings to 
obtain citizen input to this plan were held during March 
1990 in Tonopah, Carson City, and Las Vegas. The Las Vegas 
meeting had 22 attendees, about one-fourth of the total 
attendance for all three (U.S. Department of the Interior, 
Bureau of Land Management 1990a, 1). Of those 22 people,
20 represented some special interest land user group.
"Obviously many political issues do not inflame the minds 
and hearts of the populace . . . Should the Department of 
Agriculture or the Department of the Interior manage the 
federal lands? Few citizens care (Higgs 1989, 43)."
It is likely that these two issues, majority apathy 
and special interest maneuvering, cause the retention of 
these lands in federal control.
Inventory and Planning 
The public lands are to be periodically and system­
atically inventoried and subject to a coordinated land use 
planning process. Section 201 of the FLPMA directs the 
inventory process:
The Secretary shall prepare and maintain on a continuing basis an inventory of all public lands and their resource and other values (including, but not limited to, outdoor recreation and scenic values), giving priority to areas of critical environmental 
concern. This inventory shall be kept current so as to reflect changes in conditions and to identify new and emerging resource and other values (FLPMA, 42 U.S.C.A., Sec 1711).
It is important to note that resources are defined as "rec­
reation, range, timber, minerals, watershed, wildlife and 
fish, and natural scenic, scientific and historical values 
(Ibid., Sec. 1702)," a rather wider definition than is 
normally applied. This is because the NEPA requires that 
policies, regulations, and laws of the United States 
insure that "environmental amenities and values may be 
given appropriate consideration in decision making along 
with economic and technical considerations (NEPA, 4 2
14
U.S.C.A., Sec. 4332)."
The planning process calls for the development, main­
tenance, and revision of land use plans which, among other 
things, require consideration of "present and potential 
uses of the public lands," and the weighing of "long term 
benefits to the public against short-term benefits . . . 
(FLPMA, 43 U.S.C.A., Sec. 1712)." The primary way the BLM 
has of determining potential uses of the land or deciding 
long term versus short term benefits is through public 
input, because there is not a market, per se, available to 
allocate the land resource. Because of the general apathy 
of the public, discussed earlier, most of the input comes 
from special interest user groups. This input is then 
evaluated by BLM staff members of various professional 
specialties and the plan is finalized. In the general 
summary of public comment on the Tonopah Resource Man­
agement Plan - Environmental Impact Statement (RMP-EIS) 
examples of special interest influence abound. "For the 
most part commentors feel there are too many wild horses 
and burros, and they are not being properly managed . . . 
participants . . . representing the livestock industry 
commented that the RMP EIS revision was a ploy on the part 
of environmentalists, the BLM, and other third party inter­
ests to reduce livestock numbers . . . (U.S. Department of 
the Interior, Bureau of Land Management 1990a, 1, 2)." The 
planning criteria issued for development of this RMP-EIS
15
includes, among others: "Reasonable economic development
scenarios will be prepared based on existing levels of
mineral development and at least one alternative of a
higher level of mineral development (Ibid., 4)." These
scenarios will, at best, be guesses, because the drafters
of the plan cannot know what future mineral demand will be.
In a market situation, firms would develop and market
minerals as long as it was profitable to do so. Hazlitt
succinctly explains:
One function of profits, in brief, is to guide and channel the factors of production so as to apportion the relative output of thousands of different commodi­ties in accordance with demand. No bureaucrat, no matter how brilliant, can solve this problem arbitrar­ily. Free prices and free profits will maximize production . . . (Hazlitt 1979, 161).
With no price mechanism to allocate resources because 
there is no market, this inventory and planning process is 
destined for failure. "With private property rights and 
open markets, relative prices can perform their information 
and incentive functions to successfully coordinate individ­
ual plans and efficiently allocate resources . . . (Dorn 
1987, 295)." Private property rights and open markets are 
just the opposite of what the special interests groups 
desire: " . . .  special interest political influence can 
undermine the market economy by allowing these interests to 
circumvent the discipline imposed by private property and 
voluntary exchange (Lee 1987, 332)." There is not much 
incentive for the preparers of the plans, and by extension,
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the grantors of benefits, because "Public organizations do 
not directly concentrate the costs and benefits on decision 
makers. Hence, they have an incentive to shirk (Alchian 
1968, 477)." Rockwell is more pointed: "With the best 
intentions, a bureaucrat can't know what's waste and what's 
not, because he doesn't know what's economically desirable 
in the first place (Rockwell 1989b, 2)." There may even be 
an incentive to be closely aligned with the special inter­
est groups. "Bureaucrats of even the purest intentions 
cannot be expected to produce results consistent with the 
welfare of their wards if by so doing they harm their own 
professional welfare (Fort and Baden 1981, 13)."
Multiple Use and Sustained Yield 
Multiple use is defined in the FLPMA as "management 
of the public lands and their various resource values so 
that they are utilized in the combination that will best 
meet the present and future needs of the American people 
. . . (FLPMA, 43 U.S.C.A., Sec. 1702)." Sustained yield is 
meant to be "the achievement and maintenance in perpetuity 
of a high-level annual or regular periodic output of the 
various renewable resources of the public lands consistent 
with multiple use (Ibid.)." These are noble goals, but it 
is problematic that they are attainable within the public 
sector; only in the private sector; there is not a market 
mechanism available to allocate the resources.
In an economic order based on private ownership of the
17
means of production the market is the focal point of the system. The working of the market mechanism forces capitalists and entrepreneurs to produce so as to sat­isfy the consumer's needs as well and cheaply as the quantity and quality of material resources and of man power available and the state of technological knowl­edge allow (Mises 1985, 49).
As early as the 15th century, it was recognized that commu­
nal ownership of property would not produce "multiple use 
and sustained yield," as this policy statement requires.
The Spanish Late Scholastic period of thought provides the 
argument, "Privately owned productive goods are more fruit­
ful because it is natural for men to take better care of 
what is theirs than of what belongs to everybody; hence the 
medieval proverb, 'A donkey owned by many wolves is soon 
eaten' (Chafuen 1986, 55)."
The action that is actually taking place in the mul­
tiple use and sustained yield arena is that the BLM serves 
as a referee between three factions: (1) mining, non- 
locatable mineral production, and on occasion, land 
developers; (2) cattle and sheep grazing; and (3) wildlife 
and environmental coalitions of many types. All of these 
groups have managed, through lobbying or influence in other 
regulatory channels, to provide themselves a public good 
without having to pay market prices for the good.
When a group successfully provides itself a public good through the market, the resources it expends pay 
directly for the good. In contrast, when a group successfully provides itself a public good through the State, the resources it expends only pay the overhead cost of influencing State policy. The State then finances the public good through taxation or some coercive substitute (Hummel 1990, 102).
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These groups are now so entrenched in the regulatory and 
legislative process that the BLM frequently turns to them 
for research for the many plans and documents that are 
published (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 1987, Acknowl­
edgments ) .
Some of the groups seem to believe that they have 
quasi-ownership of the public lands. A recent Supreme 
Court decision illustrates that point, as well as the 
internecine warfare that occurs among the groups. In 
the case of Lujan versus National Wildlife Federation, the 
decision favored 2,250 BLM grazing decisions, which the 
Federation contended were aesthetically wrong. Had the 
Federation won, serious damage would have been done to the 
grazers. In a friend of the court brief filed by the 
American Farm Bureau Federation was the statement: "For 
generations, families have built ranches around the right 
to graze cattle on the federal lands. . . . Unfortunately, 
because of continued federal administrative control of 
those grazing rights, the very right of western ranchers to 
hold the grazing rights and thus continue their liveli­
hoods has been subjected to judicial review at the
request of special interest groups (Springer News Bulletin 
1990, 5)."
In the minutes of the July 19, 1990 meeting of the 
State Land Use Planning Advisory Council there is recorded 
discussion of a major land use acquisition where there are
19
located environmentally "sensitive areas." In this dis­
cussion there is the statement: "The Nature Conservancy 
became interested and had Congress appropriate $1 million 
into the BLM budget to acquire the land (Nevada, Department 
of Conservation and Natural Resources 1990, 10)."
As these examples show, it frequently appears that 
these lands are not being managed for the benefit of all 
the American people.
Preserve, Protect, and Provide
It is a policy of Congress that public land be 
managed:
. . . in a manner that will protect the quality of sci­entific, scenic, historical, ecological, environmental, air and atmospheric, water resource, and archeological 
(sic) values; that where appropriate, will preserve and protect certain public lands in their natural con­
dition; that will provide food and habitat for fish and wildlife and domestic animals; and that will provide 
for outdoor recreation and human occupancy and use . . . (FLPMA, 43 U.S.C.A., Sec. 1701).
This is the part of FLPMA that provides legal stand­
ing for each special interest group to sue the BLM, or it's 
parent, the DOI, when it perceives that the BLM has made a 
ruling that favors some other group. The BLM or the DOI is 
in constant litigation, having been sued in the recent past 
by wildlife groups, Indian nations, and even other units of 
government, as well as others.
This language requires that public land management be 
all things to all people. In order to defuse this dichot­
omy, a seemingly endless string of Environmental
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Assessments (EA), Environmental Impact Statements (EIS), 
and Management Plans, with the requisite public input as 
required by the NEPA, are prepared for BLM actions; hope­
fully appeasing each group by allowing it's views to be 
aired; forestalling litigation. In reality, however, this 
process can be used as a delaying tactic by opponents of 
the action being contemplated. An EA is the first document 
prepared. It's purpose is to 11 . . . briefly provide suf­
ficient evidence and analysis for determining whether to 
prepare an environmental impact statement or a finding of 
no significant impact . . . (Department of the Interior, 
Bureau of Land Management 1988, Glossary, 2)." If an EIS 
must be prepared; and litigation, or the possibility of 
litigation, frequently forces an EIS; it is required in the 
document that alternatives to the proposed action be devel­
oped and fully explained, along with any environmental 
impacts (Ibid., 6). This opens the door for further legal 
action. It is not unusual for an entire EA-EIS process to 
take years, because there are several points where public 
comment is required. All of these comments must have a 
response in the final EIS.
None of this is inexpensive. In addition to the in- 
house BLM work, EA's and EIS's are frequently contracted 
out. The costs per document range from the tens of thou­
sands of dollars for small projects to the more than $12 
million that the Air Force paid for the MX missile system
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EIS. These costs are ultimately borne by the taxpayer. 
All of this is done to preserve and protect the public 
lands.
Fair Market Value
It is a policy of Congress that " . . .  the United
States receive fair market value of (sic) the use of the
public lands and their resources unless otherwise provided
for by statute . . . (FLPMA, 43 U.S.C.A., Sec. 1701)."
Since "fair market value" is difficult to acertain because
of the lack of a market mechanism, an examination of how
rates are determined is instructive. Grazing fees are a
good example. The FLPMA directed that:
The Secretary of Agriculture and the Secretary of the Interior shall jointly cause to be conducted a study to determine the value of grazing on the lands under their jurisdiction in the eleven Western States with a view to establishing a fee to be charged for domestic live­stock grazing on such lands which is equitable to the United States and to the holders of grazing permits and leases on such lands. In making such study, the Sec­retaries shall take into consideration the costs of 
production normally associated with domestic livestock grazing in the eleven Western States, differences in forage values, and such other factors as relate to the reasonableness of such fees (FLPMA, 43 U.S.C.A., Sec. 1751).
The ultimate outcome of this study turns out to be a com­
plex formula which is used to set the fee annually. The 
fee is set at a $1.23 base per animal unit month (AUM), 
which was established by the 1966 Western Livestock Grazing 
Survey, multiplied by an escalation factor which is the 
Forage Value Index (FVI) added to the Beef Cattle Price
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Index (BCPI) minus the Prices Paid Index (PPI); then 
divided by 100.
FVI + BCPI - PPIGrazing Fee/AUM = $1.23 x — ....—
100
Further, the fee can never be less than $1.35 per AUM or 
vary more than 25% from the previous year (U.S. President 
1986, 5985). An AUM is the amount of forage needed to 
sustain one cow or one horse or five sheep, all over six 
months old, for one month (Nevada, Governor's Office of 
Community Services 1988, 288).
The Forage Value Index is a weighted average estimate 
of the annual rental charge per head per month for private 
rangeland in 11 western states where the most public land 
is located (Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, 
Arizona, Utah, Nevada, Washington, Oregon, and California) 
divided by $3.85 and multiplied by 100 (U.S. President 
1986, 5985).
The Beef Cattle Price Index is the weighted average 
annual selling price for beef cattle in the 11 states for 
November through October divided by $22.04 per hundred 
weight and multiplied by 100 (Ibid.).
The Prices Paid Index is composed of nine components 
from the National Index of Prices Paid by Farmers for Goods 
and Services, individually weighted. The components are: 
fuels and energy; farm and motor supplies; autos and 
trucks; tractors and self-propelled machinery; other
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machinery; building and fencing materials; interest; farm 
wage rates; and farm services (Ibid.).
Examination of this formula illustrates the diffi­
culty inherent in setting prices when there is no market 
mechanism available. If it is set too low, grazers are, in 
effect, given a government subsidy and inefficient produc­
ers are encouraged to stay in the market. If it is set too 
high, even efficient producers may be driven from the mar­
ket, causing a reduced supply of livestock and upward 
pressure on prices for beef and mutton.
The Forage Value Index uses private range fees as its 
basis. Since the 11 states used are those where the most 
government controlled range occurs, the amount of private 
range is relatively small. Because private range is com­
peting with government range, its price would be driven to 
the level of the government range, unless it is extraor­
dinary in its ability to support livestock. Also, the 
private range owner would, most likely, be pasturing his 
own livestock, especially if the range is extraordinary.
If this were the case, there would be no empirical data 
available, because rental fees would not exist and they 
would have to be estimated. Consequently, calculation of 
this index, which is computed by the Statistical Reporting 
Service from the June Enumerative Survey, could be prone to 
error.
By setting a minimum grazing fee of $1.35 per AUM, a
24
floor is established for rental fees for all western graz­
ing land. Private range owners could charge a lower fee, 
but with relative scarcity of private range and a finite 
limit on animal carrying capacity per acre, they would soon 
be inundated. This demand would only encourage private 
range owners to raise their fees to at least the government 
floor. Since grazing is a factor of production for beef 
and mutton, the government floor price means the consumer 
could be paying a higher price for beef and mutton if the 
real market fee were lower than the floor.
The stipulation that the fee cannot vary more than 
25% from year to year is probably designed to stabilize the 
industry by removing some amount of future uncertainty. 
However, if the escalation factor, which is substituting 
for free market supply - demand dynamics, would indicate 
that grazing fees should be up over 25%, then marginal pro­
ducers who would be priced out of the market are allowed to 
stay, at taxpayer expense. If the indication is for more 
than a 25% reduction, the consumer is paying too much for 
beef.
The government-set grazing fee may perfectly reflect 
a market price for grazing rentals, but that is impossible 
to determine without an operative market mechanism. Simple 
annual bidding by ranchers for the right to graze livestock 
would remove what has to be an expensive process of bureau­
cratically determining the fee. This would allow
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variations across the region, as well as reflect local 
forage quality differences. Going even further, priva­
tization of the land would result in contracts between 
individuals and eliminate the need for government inter­
action with grazing fees entirely.
Minerals, Timber, Food, and Fiber 
It is also a policy of Congress that ". . . the pub­
lic lands be managed in a manner which recognizes the 
Nation's need for domestic sources of minerals, food, tim­
ber, and fiber from the public lands . . . (FLPMA, 43 
U.S.C.A., Sec. 1701)." An example of this is aggregate 
sales management. Aggregates, various grades of sand and 
gravel, are used, for example, in concrete, in paving mat­
erial and for fill material.
Most of the aggregates used for construction in 
southern Nevada come from community pits located on BLM 
managed lands. The spectacular growth in the Las Vegas 
valley has increased aggregate demand significantly in the 
past several years. Approximately 90 operators draw aggre­
gates from the BLM pits. They report the amounts they 
remove, and consequently pay for, on an honor system, pre­
sumably because BLM does not have sufficient personnel 
to continuously monitor the pits.
A summary of sales for five pits named East, Salt 
Lake Highway, Lone Mountain, North Jean Lake, and Pahrump, 
for fiscal year 1989, a 365 day period, shows that 119,74 2
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cubic yards of aggregate were removed. The sales summary 
for the same pits for November 1, 1989, through February 
26, 1990, a 117 day period, shows a removal of 229,942 
cubic yards (U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of 
Land Management 1990c, 1). The amount of aggregate removed 
virtually doubled in only 3 2% of the time.
There are several possible reasons for this dramatic 
increase in sales. The first is that the BLM met with 
about half of the operators (all were invited) to urge hon­
esty in reporting. The second is that construction may 
have accelerated at an astronomical rate, however the 117 
day period coincides with a slowdown in construction caused 
by the listing of the desert tortoise as an endangered 
species. The most likely reason is that BLM biologists 
were surveying the pits for desert tortoise during this 
period. The presence of BLM vehicles probably caused more 
accurate reporting.
No matter what the reason, the figures tend to indi­
cate serious under-reporting in 1989, with the attendant 
loss of revenue. As Higgs observes, "Business interests 
frequently profit from constraints on the market economy 
(Higgs 1989, 244)." Because BLM employee pay is not linked 
to profit or loss, there is no incentive to watch the pits 
closely. That is unlikely to be the case under private 
ownership.
In a profit-driven business, the wages of each employee tend to reflect his contribution to total output. But
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incomes in a bureaucracy are based on a non-market, government-wide grading system. The only way for the bureaucrat to increase his income is through longevity and promotion, which comes through passivity and obedi­ence, not innovation or productivity (Rockwell 1989b, 
2 ).
Because of the FLPMA and the Common Varieties Act, where 
even mining claims which would provide limited privat­
ization are banned for aggregates, privatization of 
commercial activities like this are not possible (Common 
Varieties Act of 1955, 30 U.S.C.A., Sec. 611).
Minina Law
An Act to promote the development of the mining 
resources of the United States was signed into law on May 
10, 1872. With a few important exceptions, it remains 
unchanged to the present time. The purpose of the act 
indicates that the government, at that time, wanted to 
place public land into the private sector, stating that 
" . . .  all valuable mineral deposits in lands belonging to 
the United States, both surveyed and unsurveyed, are hereby 
declared to be free and open to exploration and purchase 
. . . (Mining Law of 1872, 30 U.S.C.A., Sec. 22)." A 
patent conveying ownership of the land comprising a claim 
or claim group could be obtained relatively easily with the 
filing of appropriate affidavits, proof of $500 worth of 
improvements on the property, and payment of $5.00 per acre 
for lode claims or $2.50 per acre for placer claims.
Because technology then available would not support rapid
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exploitation of mineral deposits and as a guard against 
claim "jumpers,11 many mining operations obtained patents. 
This is primarily the reason for the patchwork sections of 
private land near Tonopah, Goldfield, and Beatty.
Through the years since adoption of the 1872 mining 
law, the regulations promulgated by federal land management 
agencies and various court decisions have made the patent­
ing process time consuming and quite expensive. The 
process is now so restrictive that essentially the claim 
owner must have a fully developed, operating mining busi­
ness that can prove profitability, in order to obtain a 
patent. The cost of a mineral survey and the various other 
document filings required can easily exceed revenues. For 
these reasons, and because the owner of a valid unpatented 
claim can remove all the valuable, locatable minerals and 
then walk away after minimal reclamation of the site, very 
few claim owners seek patents; there is no incentive 
(Lancaster 1990, 1L).
An unpatented claim has a bifurcated title: the 
claimant has title to all the valuable locatable minerals; 
the government retains title to everything else. The gov­
ernment receives no royalties or payments from the claimant 
for the minerals he removes; in effect, giving the minerals 
away in exchange for retaining "multiple use" of the land 
for the public. Thus, the taxpayer subsidizes the mining 
industry on public lands. Mining may be, in fact, the
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highest and best use of some parts of the public land. If 
there is development of a working mine, the multiple use 
concept is, in actuality, inoperative, and should be recog­
nized as such. It is an interesting dichotomy that grazing 
fees, for example, are charged for a renewable resource, 
while nothing is charged for a depletable resource.
Another significant change in interpretation of the 
mining law is the doctrine of pedis possessio. possession 
by foot. Originally the intent of the law was that the 
prospector discover a valuable vein or placer deposit; 
erect a location monument at that point; stake the corners 
of his claim, not exceeding the maximum size allowed; and 
then file the claim with the county recorder. From the 
time of corner staking on, his claim was protected from 
other prospectors. He could hold it for an indefinite 
period of time by filing an affidavit each year attesting 
that $100 worth of labor, called assessment work, had been 
performed on the claim for that year. As the science of 
geology advanced, however, courts held that the discovery 
requirement need not be observed, as long as the other 
requirements were met and the claimant diligently pursued 
discovery of minerals predicted by geologic inference.
This was the doctrine of pedis possessio. Diligent pursuit 
was proven by the annual assessment work. This was a boon 
to large, well financed, legitimate mining companies. It 
also spawned the "nuisance" claim, where legal extortion is
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the motivation. All projects that are proposed on public 
land are potential targets of nuisance claims, because they 
cannot be kept confidential. The nuisance claimant is not 
interested in minerals, only in impeding the project enough 
that his claim title will be purchased. Rather than go to 
court and suffer delay or excessive legal fees, many nui­
sance claims are purchased by the harried project. The 
Department of Energy recently paid $249,000 for the relin­
quishment of 23 claims at Yucca Mountain, for example 
(Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management 
1989b, 14), even though previous studies and explorations 
revealed no economic quantities of valuable minerals 
(Department of Energy, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste 
Management 1986, 3-23).
Wilderness Law 
The Wilderness Act of 1964 directed the Secretaries 
Agriculture and the Interior to review the National For­
ests, National Parks, wildlife refuges, and game ranges to 
locate areas suitable for preservation as wilderness (U.S. 
Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management 1987, 
1987, 5). Section 2(c) of the Act defines wilderness:
A wilderness, in contrast with those areas where man 
and his own works dominate the landscape, is hereby recognized as an area where the earth and its community 
of life are untrammeled by man, where man himself is a visitor who does not remain. An area of wilderness is 
further defined to mean in this Act an area of undevel­oped Federal land retaining its primeval character and influence, without permanent improvements or human hab­
itation, which is protected and managed so as to
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preserve its natural conditions and which (1) generally appears to have been affected primarily by the forces of nature, with the imprint of man's work substantially unnoticeable? (2) has outstanding opportunities for solitude or a primitive and unconfined type of recre­ation; (3) has at least five thousand acres of land or is of sufficient size as to make practicable its pres­ervation and use in an unimpaired condition; and (4) may also contain ecological, geological, or other features of scientific, educational, scenic, or histor­ical value (Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C.A., Sec. 1131).
This review ultimately culminated in the Nevada Wil­
derness Protection Act of 1989, which set aside 417,000 
acres of land in southern Nevada National Forests as wil­
derness (Nevada Wilderness Protection Act of 1989, 16 
U.S.C.A., Sec. 1132).
BLM administered public land was not included in this 
search for wilderness until passage of the FLPMA in 1976. 
The FLPMA directed the review of all road-less areas of
5.000 acres or more using the characteristics of a wilder­
ness described in the Wilderness Act (FLPMA, 43 U.S.C.A., 
Sec. 1782). The results of this review must be submitted 
to the Secretary of the Interior in 1991. It will then be 
forwarded to the President and ultimately to Congress for 
action. The implementation of this review consisted of an 
inventory of all public lands to eliminate those which 
obviously did not meet the criteria. The remaining lands 
were designated Wilderness Study Areas (WSA's). There are
2.365.000 acres of land in WSA's in southern Nevada (U.S. 
Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management 1986, 
1). These WSA's are currently undergoing detailed study
32
including an EIS for each one. Some number of these WSA's 
will be recommended to Congress for inclusion in the 
National Wilderness Preservation system. It is likely, 
after this process has come to its conclusion, that 2 or 3 
acres of wilderness will be designated for each resident of 
southern Nevada.
Development, of any kind, in any of these areas is 
prohibited, " . . .  there shall be no commercial enterprise 
and no permanent road within any wilderness area . . . "  
and, except for emergencies, " . . .  there shall be no tem­
porary road, no use of motor vehicles, motorized equipment 
or motorboats, no landing of aircraft, no other form of 
mechanical transport, and no structure or installation 
within any such area (Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C.A., 
Sec. 1133)." Because of these restrictions, there will 
probably be very little usage of this land for recreation, 
as was intended by the law, because few people have the 
inclination or the physical conditioning to hike into these 
areas. In fact, this is exactly what the law was designed 
to do - provide solitude for a very few people.
What has happened here is that a small coalition of 
environmental groups has successfully provided itself a 
public good through the government at the expense of the 
general taxpayer. This can happen because the coalition is 
organized and politically astute. Hummel explains: " . . . 
the democratic State makes it much easier to enact policies
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that funnel great benefits to small groups than to enact 
policies that shower small benefits on large groups (Hummel 
1990, 102)." The large group, in this case, is the 
remainder of the public. This could be viewed as indirect 
appropriation of property: a taking; therefore unconstitu­
tional, after all, these lands belong to all the public.
"To take -indirectly if not directly -other people's prop­
erty for one's own benefit is now considered morally 
impeccable, provided that the taking is effected through 
the medium of the government (Higgs 1989, 195)."
Endangered Species Law 
"Thirty-six endangered or threatened species are 
native to Nevada, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service says 
(Foster 1990, 10B)." The Endangered Species Act of 1973 
" . . .  was hailed as a visionary stand for wildlife 
decimated by habitat destruction, pollution and over­
hunting (Ibid.)." In the findings section of the Act;
The Congress finds and declares that - (1) various spe­
cies of fish, wildlife, and plants in the United 
States have been rendered extinct as a consequence of economic growth and development untempered by adequate 
concern and conservation; (2) other species of fish, 
wildlife, and plants have so depleted in numbers that they are in danger of or threatened with extinction;
(3) these species of fish, wildlife, and plants are of esthetic, ecological, educational, historical, recrea­tional, and scientific value to the Nation and its people . . . (Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C.A., Sec. 1531).
The implementation of the Act begins when the Secre­
tary of the Interior is petitioned by a person requesting
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that a species be listed as threatened or endangered. The 
definition of person is quite lengthy, but essentially it 
is any entity subject to the jurisdiction of the federal 
government. The "person" frequently is a wildlife or envi­
ronmental group; for instance, the petition requesting 
endangered status for the desert tortoise was filed by the 
Environmental Defense Fund, the Natural Resources Defense 
Council, and the Defenders of Wildlife (Department of the 
Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service 1990, 12179). The 
Secretary is then required to rule on the petition, taking 
into account the best scientific evidence available. If 
approved, regulations defining conservation measures for 
the species, including designation of critical habitat, are 
issued. This makes it illegal to "take" the listed spe­
cies. Take means " . . .  harass, harm, pursue, hunt, 
shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect; or to 
attempt any of these . . . (Ibid., 12190)."
A recovery plan must be developed for each listed 
species, describing site specific management actions, esti­
mates of costs and time required, and criteria for removal 
from the list should the plan succeed. An example is the 
recovery plan for the Ash Meadows area west of Pahrump. 
Rather than preparing individual plans for each species, 
this plan covers a 23,094 acre area containing critical 
habitat for 12 listed species; four types of fish, one 
aquatic insect, and seven types of plants (U.S. Fish and
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Wildlife Service 1987, 4). Included in this area is land 
controlled by several government agencies and some private 
land which the government intends to acquire or control.
The degradation in this area is blamed on private commer­
cial operations during the 1950's and 60's. The major part 
of the land was purchased by the Nature Conservancy in 1984 
and resold to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service which 
established the Ash Meadows National Wildlife Refuge 
(Ibid., 6). BLM involvement in this plan has been the 
withdrawal from mineral entry of 2,681 acres of land, cap­
ture of wild horses, and fencing of 425 acres to keep 
horses out (Ibid., 36-7). The criteria for recovery, so 
that these species can be removed from the list, is stated 
as follows: " . . .  when threats have been removed and when 
habitats and populations have been restored, to the levels 
determined as being required by research, for a period of 
10 years (Ibid., 39)." Since the estimated cost for the 
first three years of this plan is over $3 million, it 
becomes obvious that this will be an expensive, lengthy 
project (Ibid., 156).
The " . . .  Act assumes that preserving one species 
has enormous value or benefit . . . Advocates . . . con­
tend that the process of evolution has endowed each species 
with a genetic accumulation of characteristics that 
enhances its chances of survival. If a species becomes 
extinct this genetic history disappears forever and cannot
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be passed along to future species. The loss of any single 
species detracts from the genetic pool . . . and reduces 
the range of possibilities for future adaptation (Copeland 
1990, A14)." This view is not shared by all. "There is 
general agreement among scientists that todays' species 
represent a small proportion of all those that have ever 
existed —  probably less than 1%. This means that more 99% 
of all species ever living have become extinct (Ibid.)1 
"Mass extinctions have been recorded since the dawn of 
paleontology (Gould 1989, 305)." The view that every trait 
must be preserved to ensure survival is debated in the sci­
entific community. "A trait with no previous significance, 
one that had just hitchhiked along for the developmental 
ride as a side consequence of another adaptation, may now 
hold the key to your survival (Ibid., 307)." "The evolved 
survival traits of an endangered species are no more 
valuable than the traits of the new species that will even­
tually evolve after its extinction (Copeland 1990, A14).11 
If it is true that saving a species does not necessarily 
increase survival chances of future generations, why would 
environmental groups push for strict enforcement of the 
Act? Copeland suggests that " . . . saving species is
often a subterfuge for achieving other goals, such as the 
prevention of development (Ibid.)." The listing of the 
desert tortoise on August 4, 1989, seems to substantiate 
that possibility. That listing was an emergency endangered
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listing. The final rule on April 2, 1990, reduced the 
listing to threatened, ahd responded to public comments 
(Department of the Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service 
1990, 12178-83). Several comment responses illustrate 
Copeland's assertion: The first comment questions the
listing itself, because many factors that adversely affect 
the tortoise are beyond human control. The response says, 
in part, "The act does not distinguish between human- 
induced and natural threats. Hence, if there existed a 
natural threat to the continued existence of a species, 
listing would be appropriate even if humans could do noth­
ing to minimize the threat (Ibid., 12181)." A second 
comment says that listing of the tortoise will adversely 
affect private property values and restrict the use of pri­
vate land. This response says, "Economic considerations 
may not be used in listing determinations. The tortoise 
will be protected from take wherever it occurs (Ibid.,
12182)." Another comment suggests that the Las Vegas val­
ley should be excluded from the listing because it would 
cause economic hardship, and furthermore, factors indicate 
that a long-term viable tortoise population in the valley 
is unlikely. After reiterating that economic consider­
ations cannot be considered, the response goes on, " . . . 
listing of a species is not predicated on the species' 
ability to recover. While the maintenance of a long-term 
viable population of the desert tortoise in the Las Vegas
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Valley may be unlikely, this information actually points in 
favor of listing rather than against listing (Ibid.,
12183).
About half of the desert tortoise habitat is on BLM 
administered land (Ibid., 12190). A habitat conservation 
plan is being developed. In the meantime, the tortoise 
listing 11 . . .  is blamed for delaying flood control pro­
jects and housing tracts . . .  in Las Vegas (Foster 1990, 
10B)."
Endangered and threatened species preservation is an 
emotionally charged issue. Humans inherently abhor the 
extinction of a species, however, it is perceived by some 
group or individual that every species that is listed 
impacts the ability to carry on some vocation or avocation. 
This is probably true in varying degree. The desert tor­
toise listing caused cancellation of the annual Barstow to 
Las Vegas motorcycle race, slowed or deferred construction 
projects, and is seen by grazers as a ploy to reduce live­
stock numbers.
No one owns a wild species; title to land only gives 
ownership to species habitat or access to that habitat.
This law, unlike the others discussed, applies to both pri­
vate and public land, consequently it's application has the 
ability to constrain property rights, to the detriment of 
the market.
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Wild Horse and Burro Act
It is the policy of Congress that wild free-roaming horses and burros shall be protected from capture, branding, harassment, or death; and to accomplish this they are to be considered in the area where presently 
found, as an integral part of the natural system of public lands (Wild Horse and Burro Act, 16 U.S.C.A., 
Sec. 1331).
So begins the Wild Horse and Burro Act, possibly the best 
example of a minority interest group creating a public good 
for itself through the use of the government. There are 
about 26,000 wild horses on BLM land in Nevada (Green- 
Davies 1990, 3B). A large percentage are located in 
southern Nevada. A wild horse or burro is defined as 
" . . . all unbranded and unclaimed horses and burros on 
public lands of the United States (Wild Horse and Burro 
Act, 16 U.S.C.A., Sec. 1331)."
Prior to the passage of the Act there were relatively
few wild horses and burros. An example of this is the
Nevada Wild Horse Range, an area of 394,000 acres within
the Nellis Air Force Base Range, where some wild horses
were known to exist historically. From a June, 1962, Coop-
Cooperative Agreement between the Air Force and BLM:
Identifying the area for horse use will provide an area which can be managed for the horses and their habitat. 
It is reliably estimated on the basis of counts by the State Fish and Game Department that more than 200 horses now run in this area. This approximate number of wild horses will be maintained as long as their use of the range remains in balance with the forage resources available (U.S. Department of the Interior, 
Bureau of Land Management 1989a, C-l).
In contrast, this statement was made this year about the
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number of horses on the entire Nellis Range:
Wild horse numbers are estimated at 6,400 head, 220 percent in excess of initial management number (sic); the resulting overuse of available forage continues to degrade the ecological condition on 81 percent (1,784,000 acres) of the Planning Area (U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of land Management 1990b, 3-3).
What could have happened to cause the population to 
increase to 3 2 times its original reported size? The Wild 
Horse and Burro Act was passed into law in 1971. Histor­
ically, the Nellis Range was grazed by livestock, wildlife, 
and wild horses. In 1979, the entire northern boundary of 
the Range was fenced to keep livestock out and allow more 
forage for horses. Simultaneously, water sources were 
developed and maintained by the BLM, the Air Force, the 
Department of Energy, and the National Wild Horse Associ­
ation, a Las Vegas based interest group (U.S. Department 
of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management 1989a, D-3).
With no competition for food and more water, the population 
grew rapidly; to the point that they have outstripped their 
available food and water supply and regularly die of mal­
nutrition or dehydration (Tripathi 1990). Excess numbers 
of horses cause other problems: "Vehicular traffic related 
accidents along the main access road to the Tonopah Test 
Range kill or injure an estimated 50 horses annually 
(Ibid., 4-9)," The assumption can be made that these 
accidents probably also cause human injury and property 
damage.
Wild horse special interest groups have virtual con-
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trol over this facet of the BLM's operation. Public meet­
ings on the Nellis Range EIS were held in Alamo, Tonopah, 
Caliente, and Las Vegas. As noted before, there is almost 
total public apathy. Consequently, 14 people in total 
attended the four meetings; all in Las Vegas. Of those 14, 
six oral statements were made, with five of those speakers 
associated with wild horse groups. Ten organizations with 
"horse," "burro," or "mustang" in their names are listed as 
being solicited for comments on the EIS. An additional 
five organizations in the list have broader interests, but 
have advocated wild horse and burro causes (U.S. Depart­
ment of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management 1990b,
4-6). The general membership of these groups appear to 
have little economic interest in supporting wild horses and 
burros; their interest is mainly philosophic and aesthetic. 
A newspaper article discussing a recent BLM proposal to 
capture burros in the Gold Butte area near Lake Mead 
because of overcrowding stated: "BLM officials plan to 
capture the burros Aug. 26, provided there are no legal 
protests by any animal-rights groups to the Internal Board 
of Land Appeal, a division of the U.S. Interior Department 
. . . The National Environmental Policy Act requires the 
BLM to notify any interested parties prior to a capture of 
wild burros or horses. . . .  An appeal would stop the 
capture until the board made a final determination (Green- 
Davies 1990, 3B)." Virtually every BLM plan for a solution
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to the burgeoning wild horse population results in a chal­
lenge. The groups seem especially adamant about livestock 
grazing to the perceived detriment of wild horse forage 
(Wild Horse and Burro Act, 16 U.S.C.A., Sec. 1331).
One BLM solution to the overpopulation problem is the 
adopt-a-horse program, where the animals are captured, and 
for a small fee, released to individual citizens. The 
interest groups grudgingly go along with this. A local 
representative of the National Wild Horse Association said 
11 . . . the adoption program is better than just letting 
the horses die in the desert (Karaim 1990, 5A)." However, 
there is a price. "The program has cost $81 million since 
1985, an average of $1,500 a horse (Ibid.)." And once 
again " . . .  the general taxpayer often finds himself 
subsidizing the destruction of the environment while making 
transfer payments to bureaucrats and highly specific spe­





The examples in Chapter 2 show what " . . .  was common 
knowledge among the founders of our constitutional order: 
majoritarian democratic processes can, without proper consti­
tutional constraints, easily accommodate the plunder of some 
for the benefit of others (Wagner 1987, 324)." This is a 
result of the mixed economy. "The most common methods of 
governmental control have been not explicit takeovers but 
rather heavy taxation and subsidization (often in hidden 
forms) and, especially, extensive regulation of ostensibly 
private activities (Higgs 1989, 240)." Further, Baden and 
Stroup state " . . .  we are increasingly convinced that both 
the environmental and the economic costs of bureaucratic 
management of natural resources are excessively and unneces­
sarily high. These social costs are generated by perverse 
institutional structures that give authority to those who do 
not bear responsibility for the consequences of their actions 
(Baden and Stroup 1981, 1)." "From time immemorial govern­
ments have been eager to interfere with the working of the 
market mechanism. Their endeavors have never attained the 
ends sought (Mises 1985, 58)."
The solution, briefly stated, is abolition of the BLM
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and privatization of the land it controls. This would cause 
some amount of pandemonium and a great hue-and-cry from the 
special interest groups. However, when the land is auc­
tioned, the outcome for these groups may, in fact, be better. 
By selling the land to the highest bidder, the highest and 
best use of the land will be determined by the market. The 
interests of future generations, a reason for holding the 
land in public trust, will be maintained by more concerned 
and involved management of the land. Analysis follows.
Mining and Minerals
Mining claims, as discussed previously, have a bifur­
cated title. A claimant, under the Mining Law of 1872, owns 
the mineral rights, and this solution would recognize that 
ownership. The land, the part owned by the government, would 
be put up for auction. There would be a strong incentive for 
the present claimant to buy the land, especially if there 
exists a profitable mine, thereby reuniting the title. If 
the claimant were out-bid, then he would have to negotiate 
with the new land owner for access to the land to recover his 
minerals, but that is the purpose of contract law. If the 
land being sold does not have mining claims, then the mineral 
rights would be sold in conjunction with the land.
Some of the biggest complaints about mines by environ­
mentalists are " . . .  an ugly legacy of poisoned streams, 
abandoned waste dumps and maimed landscape (Lancaster 1990, 
1L)." This would be less likely under private land owner­
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ship. It is inevitable that the valuable mineral being mined 
will ultimately be depleted. The miner will want to dispose 
of his improvements and the land, if he is the landowner, to 
recover costs. This means the property will need to be made 
attractive to prospective buyers. If the miner is not the 
landowner, the owner will, if he has been diligent in his 
contract, require reclamation to his specifications. In 
either case, the land will be restored to a salable con­
dition, which is not now necessary. The reclamation 
requirement of the BLM is not severe and, as conservationists 
complain, laxly enforced (Ibid., 3L). This is one reason 
that mining companies no longer seek patents; they can walk 
away from physical alterations they have made on BLM land 
with a small amount of clean-up when the valuable mineral has 
run out. Later; usually years, and frequently at the urging 
of environmental groups, whatever environmental hazard that 
has been produced by the defunct mine will be rectified at 
taxpayer expense.
At this point in the privatization process, the true 
value of the minerals being mined will still not be known, 
because the government gave the mineral title to the claim­
ant. Ultimately, however, as these mines are depleted, 
miners will need to search on the now private land and some­
one, other than the government, will own the mineral rights. 
Lease arrangements, royalties, sale, rents or some other 
mechanism will price one of the factors of mineral pro-
duction, the ore itself, and the true value will be apparent.
This may tend to raise prices of minerals, but the market
will determine the quantity required.
Within the market society the working of the price mech­anism makes the consumers supreme. They determine 
through the prices they pay and through the amount of their purchases both the quantity and quality of pro­
duction. They determine directly the prices of all material factors of production and the wages of all hands employed (Mises 1985, 49).
Obviously, there will no longer be a place for the 
Mining Law of 1872 and it can be discarded. The previously 
discussed nuisance claims will not be possible when the land 
is privatized, in fact, claims of any type will be impos­
sible.
For the so-called saleable and leasable minerals, like 
aggregates, which were not possible to claim, the land and 
mineral rights would simply be sold together and, aggregate 
sales, for instance, would become private business ventures.
Grazing
Grazers, as opposed to mining claimants, do not own 
title to anything. They do, however, have a lease arrange­
ment with the government, allowing them to graze a BLM 
determined number of livestock on their grazing allocation. 
When the land is sold it will be necessary to make the sale 
of land with grazing leases subject to the lease for its 
duration to avoid litigation. The fee and number of live­
stock allowed to graze could be open to negotiation, however. 
This would be moot if the grazer using the land bought it.
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When the lease duration expired, the restriction on the land 
owner would be lifted and the owner would be free to do what 
he wished with the land.
It is quite likely that efficient grazers who have been 
profitable under the current system would opt to bid on the 
land they have been using. Their competition would most 
likely come from environmental, wildlife, and wild horse 
groups, discussed later. Many grazers have used the same 
lands for generations and have installed improvements such as 
water facilities and corrals with the blessing of the BLM.
The reason this was allowed was because wildlife and wild 
horses would also benefit. The ability to operate without 
the constraints of BLM's multiple use land management prac­
tices would probably allow the grazers to run more livestock 
on less land than they had previously used. Their range 
would become more efficient because it would no longer be a 
commons.
The 'tragedy of the commons' occurs when the value to users is sufficiently great that users overuse and 
destroy the commons, leaving everyone worse off than they would be had they been able to agree on a more complete 
assignment of property rights for rationing purposes (Bish 1987, 390).
Wilderness. Environment, and Endangered Species 
The 12 largest environmental groups have annual revenues of 
about $250 million (Stroup 1990, A14). Adding in research 
organizations and the host of smaller activist groups would 
probably bring the total near one-half billion dollars.
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These groups have tremendous monetary power and are, obvi­
ously, supported by a significant minority of the population. 
Their actions, to date, have been committed to supplying 
their memberships with a quasi-public good at the expense of 
the taxpayer.
The major environmental groups are committed to pro­tecting the environment by exerting political pressure to change statutes, court interpretations of statutes and executive branch regulations. The tax laws require that they limit their spending on direct lobbying to 20% of their revenues, but in essence their entire program bud­get is designed to change government laws and practices. Typically, this effort represents close to 75% of their total budget (Ibid.).
In this solution all of the BLM land will be auctioned off, 
including WSA's, endangered species habitat, and areas of 
environmental concern. The environmental interests could use 
their revenues to purchase the tracts of greatest concern to 
them. "If environmental groups really want to save endan­
gered species . . . they would do well to consider applying 
their ample revenues to purchasing land or protective ease­
ments. Using some of their funds for purchase could give 
them a permanent impact that is elusive today (Ibid.)." This 
would do much more for the environment than lobbying and 
lawsuits. It would also allow the groups to have the wilder­
ness they so much want to themselves because they could 
exclude others. It is possible that they may become entre­
preneurial and charge admission to enter their habitats.
Some of the old-time groups have been, for years, pur­
suing the market approach. The Nature Conservancy and Ducks
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Unlimited are two examples.
The Nature Conservancy has been using markets since 1951 and now owns and manages nearly 2.6 million acres of land selected to preserve endangered wildlife or plants. . . . Ducks Unlimited, for example, spends $30 million a year to lease or purchase conservation easements and to create wetlands (Ibid.).
A growing problem is terrorism by environmental fringe
elements. This solution would serve to diffuse violence for
two reasons: the private landowner is more likely to keep a
watchful eye on his property and the groups themselves could
buy areas where they are currently applying guerrilla tactics
to discourage development. As Bandow notes,
. . . pork-minded legislators need to abandon the sort of spendthrift and ruinous management policies that have rightly angered many environmentalists. Land should be privatized and subsidies ended. That abuses exist is no excuse for violence, but reforming current policy would reduce people's incentive to violate the law (Bandow 1990, A14).
Wild Horses
The wild horse groups would have essentially the same 
incentives as environmental groups. They would want to 
acquire the most desirable range for horses and fence it to 
keep their charges contained. This is because the Wild Horse 
and Burro Act is predicated on vast tracts of public land 
that will no longer exist, consequently, the Act itself 
becomes unnecessary. The horses, being considered a part of 
the land would be owned by whoever bought the land. This 
does not mean that wild horses and burros will cease to 
exist, only that they will be free to roam only in whatever
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preserve the advocacy groups purchase. It is possible that 
the numbers of horses will be reduced, but their individual 
physical condition will probably improve because their habi­
tat will be managed by ardent supporters for their benefit 
only, exactly the benefit that private ownership provides.
The horse groups, too, may become entrepreneurial and charge 
admission to see the horses.
Recreation
It is unlikely that recreational groups would bid on any 
of the land and they shouldn't need to. Hunting and fishing 
can be arranged with individual landowners, as they are 
throughout the Midwest. Rockhounds could do the same thing. 
Hikers, backpackers, and campers will probably belong to an 
environmental group and have access to the same areas as they 
do now. Off-road races are now mostly confined to estab­
lished routes because of endangered species concerns, and 
there is no reason to believe that race promoters would not 
be able to lease or rent race courses from the new land­
owners .
Indians
The Western Shoshone tribe believes that is owns most of 
the center of southern Nevada through the Treaty of Ruby 
Valley. Indeed, Article V of the Treaty indicates that 
" . . . the boundaries of the country claimed and occupied by 
said bands . . . " is a huge area (U.S. 1863). Unfortu-
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unately, Article VI gives the President of the United States 
the authority to move the tribe to reservations within that 
area, where they are " . . .  to reside and remain therein 
(Ibid.).11 This article was exercised. The Shoshones have 
brought several lawsuits, with different plaintiffs, against 
the United States. All of these have ultimately ended in the 
Supreme Court, with the United States winning. Compensation 
of between $20 and 30 million has been offered by the govern­
ment, but the Shoshone, a proud people, have never accepted. 
The simple fact is that they would like to run their cattle 
or sheep, unrestricted by boundaries.
This solution could solve this problem. At this point 
in time, the Shoshones are mostly grazers, but still adhere 
to their religious beliefs about the sanctity of the land, 
plants, and animals that occur in southern Nevada. When 
the land is auctioned, the compensation that has been offered 
by the government could be put into an account for the 
Shoshones, and they could use it to bid on the land. There 
is a strong likelihood that they could regain a good portion 
of their ancestral land.
The BLM
The BLM, as a branch of the Interior department, would 
cease to exist after it auctions the land. This would not be 
an easy task. "The worst defect with public operations is 
probably not so much starting improper services as getting 
them stopped . . . Public suppliers have much more leverage
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to keep the revenues coining from taxpayers than they do from 
unsatisfied users (Gunderson 1990, 199).” Higgs points out 
” . . .  bureaucracies are easier to create than to destroy; 
hence . . . bureaucrats, and the number of rules they issue 
all increase irreversibly over time (Higgs, 1989, 68).” The 
BLM illustrates this last point with about 1560 pages in 
Title 43 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
The local employees of the BLM should have little trou­
ble finding employment. The new owners of the land will need 
people to manage wilderness, mineral exploration, range­
land, and the other uses in which the BLM has specialists. 
Unleashed from the bureaucratic system, and now responsible 
for their actions, these people will have every incentive to 
excel. "Only with entrepreneurial freedom will the inno­
vation required to increase prosperity occur (Stroup 1987, 
408) ."
The Taxpayer
Because " . . .  freedom and prosperity are incompatible 
with extensive regulatory or tax/transfer powers in the hands 
of government (Ibid.)," the taxpayer should benefit from this 
solution for public lands. This solution will eliminate a 
part of government bureaucracy. "In the case of the career 
bureaucrat, the maximization of personal welfare becomes 
inextricable from the maximization of his agency's welfare, 
particularly its budget (Fort and Baden 1981, 14)." The BLM 
part of the budget would disappear, easing the burden on the
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taxpayer.
As discussed before, the land should become more pro­
ductive under private ownership, because it is no longer a 
commons. This, too, will benefit the taxpayer. The general 
increase in prosperity caused by greater productivity will 
increase tax revenues to governments, which could allow lower 
rates for everyone.
The money received by the government from sales will 
also benefit the taxpayer. Although per acre receipts are 
not likely to be high (remember, this is the land nobody 
wanted, and in many cases, this is probably still true), even 
at $10 per acre average, total revenue would amount to $180 
million in southern Nevada.
This solution benefits the taxpayer in every way: less 
government; lower taxes; and more productive use of resources 
leading to greater prosperity.
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